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Introduction 
The purpose of this paper is to examine the impact of peak-level tripartism on 
economic reforms in Singapore and South Korea. Specifically, the paper attempts to 
answer the question of whether tripartism alters the pace, the sequence, the mix, or the 
content of economic reforms or the environment in which the reforms are implemented. It 
also seeks to obtain evidence on the impact of tripartism on specific measurable 
outcomes. 
Tripartism is defined as the negotiation of national policies between 
representatives of government, labor and employers associations, as opposed to mere 
consultation and information sharing between these actors. Singapore and South Korea 
are chosen for this analysis since they represent the only two countries in Asia in which 
there is/has been some significant degree of tripartism. We argue that there are important 
differences in the nature of tripartism in both countries. Not only does tripartism vary in 
terms of scope, the independence and representativeness of the actors, its degree of 
institutionalization, its continuity, but also in terms of its effect on various economic and 
non-economic reforms. 
In order to examine the impact of tripartism on economic reforms and outcomes, 
we proceed as follows. In section 1, we present a very brief overview of economic 
development in both countries. Section 2 canvasses the historical development of 
tripartism in each country and outlines its main features. In section 3, we focus on 
specific cases of the effect of tripartism on reforms and outcomes. Note that these 
specific cases of the effect of tripartism on reforms or economic strategies are not 
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perfectly comparable, as they occur during different historical junctures in these nations’ 
development, and reflect particular problems and issues faced by each country. Section 4 
concludes. 
Although the focus of this paper and the research project is on the impact of 
tripartism on economic reforms in Asia, these two cases of Singapore and South Korea 
also permit us to argue that, on a more general level, broadly institutionalized tripartism 
permits smooth and continuous adaptation. The Singapore case demonstrates the 
importance of tripartism in shaping the country’s ability to continuously adapt to different 
economic circumstances and shocks with relatively little disruption and relatively little 
deleterious effect on the well being of its citizens. In contrast, less institutionalized 
tripartism, as seen in South Korea, represents a limited and temporary ability to cope at a 
critical economic juncture, in this case the Asian financial crisis. In the concluding 
section of the paper we speculate on the initial conditions that give rise to different 
degrees of institutionalization of tripartism in the two countries. 
This paper has drawn from prior research, interviews with key observers and 
actors and data from a variety of sources. While actual socio-economic outcomes such as 
growth, inequality and social protection are mediated by a number of variables, (and 
hence more difficult to link causally to tripartism), it is the cases that we examine in 
section 3 that provide the basis for the argument that tripartism does significantly affect 
the content, mix, sequencing and outcomes of economic reforms. The next section 
examines the economic development history of these two countries. 
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SECTION 1: ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN SINGAPORE AND SOUTH KOREA 
The economic development strategies of Singapore and South Korea have 
received considerable attention in prior literature and it is not our intention to repeat them 
here. We briefly review the development of both countries, highlighting major features. 
Those interested in more details must refer to the large list of published works on both 
countries’ development strategies and policies. In particular, see Rodan (1991) and Huff 
(1987) for Singapore and Amsden (1989) and World Bank (1993) for South Korea. 
Singapore 
In 1964 the GDP of Singapore was merely US$4.5 billion with an annual growth 
rate of 0.6% and a GDP per capita US$2,453. However, over the past four decades 
Singapore has fundamentally transformed itself from a “developing” country into a 
“developed” one. By 2004, Singapore’s GDP and GDP per capita had increased to US$ 
102.5 billion and US$23,636 respectively. Moreover, the trade deficit of US$651 million 
in 1964 became a trade surplus of US$31,210 million in 2004 and the gross domestic 
savings rate increased from -74% to 48% during the same period. Table 1 shows the 
major indicators of Singapore’s economic growth between 1960 and 2004. 
Insert Table 1 Here 
A very detailed account of Singapore’s economic development can be found in Huff 
(1987) and Rodan (1991), which are briefly summarized here. Singapore declared 
independence in 1965 and followed an import substitution industrialization (ISI) strategy 
in 1965-1967, which was unsuccessful for a variety of reasons. The decision of the 
British government to withdraw its troops in the late 1960s (British military activity 
accounted for 18% of GDP) was another blow. And the Indonesian confrontation 
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campaign of 1963-1966 resulted in suspension of trade with Singapore’s major trading 
partner. It is under these conditions that Singapore began to re-position itself on a path of 
export-oriented industrialization (EOI) by taking a series of measures to produce the 
political and economic preconditions for export-oriented growth. Further, on the social 
front, the state successfully inculcated the “ideology of survival”, which demanded of its 
citizens an entirely new set of social attitudes and beliefs which embodied self-sacrifice 
for the national interest. The specifics of these social, economic and political pre-
conditions have been extensively discussed elsewhere (e.g. Rodan 1991), but included 
neutralizing the power of organized labor and reducing wages, substantial infrastructural 
improvements, providing tax benefits for exports of manufacturing goods, reducing quota 
and tariff restrictions on imports of equipment, machinery and raw materials, and opening 
widely the doors to foreign investment, particularly direct investment by multinational 
companies. Moreover, state control was extended to all facets of the economy to support 
the EOI strategy. This involved not only the provision of special institutional support, 
such as the establishment of some public limited companies and statutory boards to 
enhance industrial development, but also direct government investments (e.g. in the 
shipbuilding, electronic and petroleum industries) to influence Singapore’s industrial 
structure. In addition, the government was also active in tailoring the education system to 
the needs of industry. In 1969 six new vocational institutes were established for the 
teaching of trade skills and the faculties of engineering, accounting and business 
administration, and building and architecture were introduced to the University of 
Singapore. Manufacturing for export led to considerable economic expansion (GDP per 
capita doubled between 1965 and 1972 reaching US$5,432) and the emergence of the 
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electrical machinery industry by 1969 more than anything else signified that the EOI 
strategy of Singapore was successful. 
As the growth from EOI eased unemployment and Singapore became dependent on 
imported labor to fill shortages, the government began to shift its focus from unskilled, 
labor-intensive production to relatively capital-intensive, higher value-added one. This 
shift started in the early 1970s and intensified after 1978 when Singapore embarked on 
the so-called “Second Industrial Revolution”. The new strategy was characterized by a 
series of state interventions to discourage low-skill, labor-intensive production, on the 
one hand, and encourage capital-intensive, higher value-added investments, on the other, 
including significantly raising wage levels, tariff revisions and restrictions on imported 
labor, generous tax and fiscal incentives for appropriate new investments, dramatic 
expansions and improvements of social and physical infrastructures, and direct 
government investments to stimulate favored forms of production. Moreover, the 
Singapore government also made efforts to expand education at all levels (particularly at 
the tertiary and technical levels). Essentially, the state ensured that workforce 
development was closely tailored to the needs of private companies engaged in or 
moving towards higher value-added production (e.g. a number of institutes of technology 
to teach specialized and sophisticated skills on a higher technological plane were set up 
with the collaboration of the German, Japanese, and French governments). See Kuruvilla, 
Erickson and Huang (2002) for a detailed account of Singapore’s remarkable success in 
increasing rapidly the skills of its workforce. The state’s success in raising workers’ skills 
to accelerate industrial restructuring is evidenced by the increase in productivity---
between 1973 and 1982 value-added per worker in manufacturing increased from about 
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one-quarter to almost two-fifths. In addition, due to both its labor cost advantage (in 
spite of the high wage policy of 1979-81 and rises thereafter), and the stability and 
flexibility that Singapore afforded to foreign investors, foreign direct investment rose 
substantially from US$186 million in 1978 to US$1,210 million in 1984. Apart from a 
consolidation of international capital in the petroleum, electronics and non-electrical 
machinery industries, investment in chemicals also emerged as significant, while 
investment in Singapore’s comparatively low value-added, labor intensive industries, 
notably textile and apparel, shrank substantially. Such a large-scale movement of foreign 
investment played a key role in Singapore’s industrial restructuring towards higher value-
added production. By 1983, Singapore was well on the road to “development” with a 
GDP per capita US$10,253, more than threefold that of 1967. 
Since the mid 1980s, Singapore has entered a service-based economic development 
stage (Kuruvilla 1996) that derives largely from the growth in several service industries, 
such as transport and communications, banking and financial services, and others such as 
ship repairs. In particular, the economic development goal was to establish Singapore as a 
“financial supermarket,” a regional center for sophisticated financial services. By 2004, 
Singapore had, to certain extent, successfully realized its ambition as an advanced 
economy with a leading position in production and services. 
It is important to understand the political context in which this rapid economic 
development has taken place. Although a democracy, the ruling party PAP (People’s 
Action Party) has held a tight grip on power, both through the legitimacy derived from 
producing economic gains for the population, as well as the design of an electoral system 
that has effectively prevented the development of a coherent opposition. Furthermore, a 
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highly technocratic government has promoted support for its policies through its 
effectiveness and through a series of very successful government public education 
campaigns designed by its psychological defense unit. Its President for much of its 
development history, Lee Kuan Yew, had a low tolerance for dissent or criticism, 
although he promoted the consensual form of decision-making that has evolved into the 
tripartite model today. 
South Korea 
After the Korean War (1950-1953), South Korea ranked as one of the poorest 
countries in the world and was almost entirely dependent on U.S. aid. By 1960, after 
some of the damage of the war had been repaired, South Korea’s GDP reached US$3.9 
billion while per capita GDP was only US$160. However, by 2004, South Korea had 
become a developed country, a member of the OECD, with a per capita GDP of 
US$14,136, and total GDP of US$679 billion. Also, the trade deficit of US$273 million 
in 1960 became a trade surplus of US$31,210 million by 2004. Table 2 clearly shows the 
remarkable progress South Korea had made between 1960 and 2004. 
Insert Table 2 Here 
We will briefly describe South Korean economic development strategies here (see 
Amsden 1989; Harvie and Lee 2003; World Bank 1993 for more detailed accounts). 
South Korea’s unprecedented economic growth started in the early 1960s when the 
government shifted its development strategy from ISI to EOI by pursuing active, 
comprehensive policies of trade reform and export promotion. Exporters were supported 
with beneficial exchange rates, extensive direct export subsidies, tax benefits, tariff 
exemptions, preferential credit and loans through the state-controlled banking system, 
8 
and exemptions from import controls. In addition, export targets were agreed upon 
between the government and individual firms, and firms that failed to achieve their 
targets ran the risk of heavy administrative sanctions. The government also took policies 
to encourage inflows of foreign capital to compensate for the insufficiency of domestic 
savings. The EOI strategy resulted in not only rapid economic growth and structural 
changes but also increases in employment, income and savings. However, the forced 
expansion of exports led to a high and rising debt-equity ratio and distortions in firm 
internal decision-making. And from the early days of South Korean economic 
development, a relationship based system developed among firms, banks, and the 
government, which exists even today (Harvie and Lee 2003). 
To increase South Korea’s competitiveness in the world market, in the early 1970s 
the government shifted its focus to the promotion of new strategic export industries and 
import substitution of intermediate inputs and capital goods by employing all its levers to 
steer resources into specific sectors to rapidly alter the industrial structure. Massive 
investment programs were introduced to promote heavy and chemical industries (HCI). 
Particularly, steel, heavy machinery, automobiles, industrial electronics, shipbuilding, 
non-ferrous metals and petrochemicals were classified as strategic, receiving generous 
government support including tax incentives, subsidized public services, and preferential 
financing. Other policies and measures such as government ownership, subsidization of 
many financial institutions, and mechanisms for mandatory saving were also used by the 
state to facilitate such promotion. During this HCI drive period, industrial conglomerates 
(chaebol) also experienced rapid growth and diversification leading to the rapid 
transformation of the South Korean industrial structure and to market concentration. As 
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Harvie and Lee (2003) noted, the share of manufacturing output of the twenty largest 
groups increased from 7 percent to 29 percent in 1972-1982, and the ten largest chaebols 
accounted for 48 percent of GNP by 1980. However, the big push for HCI also resulted in 
huge excess capacity in these industries, accumulation of non-performing loans in the 
financial sector and large-scale debts. 
In the mid 1980s, South Korea’s economic development focus shifted from HCI 
promotion to economic stabilization and liberalization with the aim of establishing an 
unbiased incentive structure, promoting competition, and preventing big business 
dominance in the market. Former preferences for specific industries were reduced, and a 
series of measures were taken to promote trade and financial liberalization, market 
opening, the development of small and medium enterprises, and technological upgrading. 
South Korea’s economic development during the 1980s and much of the 1990s has been 
remarkable, and only interrupted by the Asian financial crisis. 
The political context in which much of this rapid economic expansion took place 
was clearly autocratic, with military dictatorships persisting until 1987. Given the lack of 
opposition, the government combined with selected private companies to provide the 
average South Korean with rapid increases in his/her standard of living. Democratization 
in 1987 has fundamentally changed its approach to governance, however, although the 
efficiency that marks the South Korean approach to government is still apparent. 
Summary 
Both Singapore and South Korea have experienced remarkable economic growth 
mainly through the employment of an EOI strategy since the 1960s and have successfully 
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transformed themselves from developing countries into developed ones. There are some 
commonalities in their paths. Particularly, both countries are good examples of state-led 
development. The state has played a strong role as facilitator, initiator, and employer in 
the economic development process. In Singapore, the state’s control over significant 
corporations (e.g. Singapore Airlines, Temasek) continues, while South Korea has 
embarked on privatization after the financial crisis. 
A comparison of state-led development and market-led development is instructive 
here. Jeanette Park (2004) notes in comparing South Korea with Chile: 
“To illustrate the comparative benefits of the state-led over the market-led 
approach, South Korea and Chile may be compared as two respectively prototypical 
countries. In 1970s, South Korea was beginning the implementation of its state-led 
development policies, while Chile was pursuing its radically free market agenda under 
dictator Augusto Pinochet. Comparatively, the two ranked close in terms of economic 
and political development, with Chile probably slightly better off in terms of economic 
capacity. In 2002, thirty years later, South Korea’s gross domestic product per capita 
(GDP) was nearly double that of Chile (US$19,400 vs. US$10,000) and Chile had a 
poverty rate about five times higher than that of South Korea (21 percent vs. 4 percent). 
More significantly, South Korea’s current technological and industrial capacity is many 
times greater than Chile’s, which actually experienced de-industrialization under the 
free-market-led policies.1 
This dramatic difference between the two countries arose from South Korea’s 
ability to improve its comparative advantage in the world market by building industries 
in sectors that were not necessarily comparatively advantageous at the time of 
development. State support allowed these new industries in steel, automobiles, and 
electronics to develop and strengthen. In contrast, when Chile entered the free 
international market in the 1960s, market forces pushed the economy to play to its 
current comparative advantage, which at that point in Chile’s development lay mostly in 
raw agricultural goods. At least a part of Chile’s de-industrialization was due to the 
inability of existing industries to compete with the influx of foreign products and the 
inability of new industries to emerge because of a lack of protection during their 
vulnerable emergent stages. If South Korea had pursued radically free-market policies in 
the 1970s, it is highly unlikely that it would be ranked as a newly industrialized country 
today. Lacking the abundance of natural resources of Chile, South Korea would have 
probably depended on trading in the international economy its cheap labor and some 
1
 Note that Park’s figures differ from those in our Table 1 for Korea. This is because Park obtained the data 
from the World Factbook, which used purchasing power parity rates in calculating GDP, while the figures 
in Table 1 use constant US dollars. 
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light manufacturing goods, the two being their primary areas of comparative advantage 
in the immediate post-Korean War years”. 
SECTION 2: ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT OF TRIPARTISM IN SINGAPORE 
AND SOUTH KOREA 
Singapore 
As Wong (2004) notes in her paper, tripartism is pretty well institutionalized in 
Singapore. Apart from the flagship tripartite national wages council, many statutory 
boards and institutions in Singapore have tripartite governance structures of varying 
intensity built into them. Tripartism is evidenced in the governance of key institutions 
such as the Economic Development Board (EDB), the Productivity and Standards Board 
(PSB), the Central Provident Funds (CPF), the Institute for Technical Education, and 
higher educational institutions. As the General Secretary of the National Trade Union 
Congress (NTUC) and Minister without Portfolio in the Singapore government observed 
in a 2001 speech: “Tripartism is thus a major competitive strength of Singapore which 
must be preserved and protected” (Lim Boon Heng 2001). He also noted that: “tripartism 
involving painstaking consensus building has enabled tough decisions and long-term 
development strategies to be implemented.” Tripartism appears firmly ensconced in the 
national “lexicon” of Singapore. For example, the Minister of State for education, Mr. 
Chan Soo Sen noted in 2004: “We have shown a unique spirit of solidarity and resilience 
through tripartism, with the government, employers and the labour movement working 
together, consulting each other, working out and implementing measures to restructure 
and reposition our economy, while aiming for win-win” (Ministry of Education 2004). 
What accounts for the rise and continued popularity of tripartism in Singapore? 
We argue that an understanding of tripartism requires a historical perspective, particularly 
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regarding the development of the relationship between the trade unions (now represented 
by the NTUC) and the ruling PAP in Singapore. 
The political struggle between the communists and the British (Leggett 2005) was 
converted into a struggle between the leftists and the moderates within the PAP when it 
came to power in 1959. Wong (2004) notes that over half of the founding members of the 
PAP in 1955 were trade union members and 90% of the people present at its inaugural 
meeting were trade union members. The disagreements between moderates and leftists 
(over the merger with Malaysia), forced a split, with one faction forming a new political 
party, the Barisaan Socialis (BS), headed by Lim Chin Siong. This faction involved about 
6 of the top 10 NTUC leaders and 12 out of 40 members of the Singapore assembly. The 
union leaders took 43 unions out of the NTUC to form a new labor federation, the SATU 
(Singapore Association of Trade Unions). By 1963, the battle lines were firmly drawn 
between the two parties (and the union federations). The PAP labeled the BS and SATU 
as communists. 
When the PAP convincingly won the 1963 elections, it attacked the so-called 
“communists”, using the internal security ordinance to arrest many of their leaders in an 
operation famously known as COLDSTORE, while the registrar of trade unions refused 
to register SATU as a federation and the registration of various SATU unions. This 
“administrative” attack was devastating, as trade union membership declined from 
189,032 in 1962 to 142,936 in 1963. With the elimination of SATU, the PAP then 
proceeded to create “a responsible” trade union organization through union restructuring 
and redefinition (Leggett, 2005), sponsoring the NTUC. A former leftist, C.V. Devan 
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Nair brought all of the unions under the NTUC and into a coalition with the PAP (Leggett 
2005). Ali Raza (1970) provides a more detailed account of these developments. 
By 1965, the government, employers and the NTUC had signed the charter of 
industrial progress (a forerunner of tripartism) that called for a concerted effort to raise 
productivity in the new export-oriented manufacturing industry. Joint productivity 
councils were established in every enterprise. And the state exhorted the unions to restrict 
their demands for high wages, and in certain “pioneer” industries, the government wanted 
the unions to sign 3 year contracts rather than 2 year contracts. Of a total of 130,000 
union members in 107 unions, the NTUC accounted for 41 unions, but a majority of the 
members (100,000). Since the government had given “moral, political, and financial 
support” to the NTUC, it expected “good behavior in return,” including active support in 
its efforts to lower costs to allow foreign employers to get a reasonable return on their 
capital, or else they will go elsewhere (Ali Raza 1970:229). Prime Minister Lee Kuan 
Yew, in his opening speech at the 4th delegate conference of the NTUC in 1967 noted that 
foreign investment would go to places “where unions are led by men who understand just 
how far they can go without crippling or killing the goose whose eggs they want” (Ali 
Raza 1970:231). 
The efforts to create responsible trade unions were buttressed by legislation that 
reflected the government’s pre-occupation with stability to attract foreign investment. 
The Industrial Arbitration Court (IAC) was established, with wide powers to “cognize” 
collective bargaining agreements (and to refuse to “cognize” agreements that were 
inimical to Singapore’s competitive position), apart from having the final word on 
disputes. The employment act prohibited strikes while a dispute was under consideration 
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of the IAC, and matters concerning transfers, promotions, and job assignments were 
clearly established as management rights issues. The industrial relations amendment bill 
of 1968 confined terms and conditions of service in a collective bargaining agreement to 
those prescribed as minima under the employment act of 1955. Stability had been 
achieved; the number of industrial disputes fell sharply, as did trade union membership. 
The government, being the largest employer at that time (30% of the workforce), also 
ensured a cap on real wage increases. Meanwhile, it launched what is now known as the 
1969 modernization seminar, which crafted the deal for labor-management collaboration 
and a shift away from adversarial industrial relations, and for the NTUC, a broader role in 
society beyond collective bargaining. Unions were strengthened with the government’s 
agreement to permit “dues check off” (Wong 2004). In later years unions also developed, 
with government assistance, a major new role for themselves delivering services through 
the cooperative movement, which provides goods and services at affordable rates for 
workers--e.g. supermarkets, insurance, holiday homes, childcare and eldercare. 
As is evident from the above discussion, two issues are particularly important. 
First, the PAP was successful in carefully redefining the scope and purpose of trade 
unionism in Singapore through its intervention in the NTUC. As Ali Raza (1970) notes, 
as long as the PAP is in power, the NTUC can depend on the government for money, 
moral support, and in dire cases de-registration of its rival unions. Second, there is the 
close connection between PAP leaders and NTUC leaders. NTUC leaders have 
consistently thereafter talked about the NTUC-PAP symbiosis (Leggett 2005). To what 
extent this is a “meeting of the minds” of “equals” through the effect of the 
“modernization” seminar, or a direct subjugation of the NTUC by the PAP is an open 
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question. It is true that in later years (Leggett 2005), the PAP has intervened in NTUC’s 
leadership issues (effectively replacing Lim Chee Onn as General Secretary in the early 
1980s with Ong Teng Cheong who was more unitarist). A reading of the evidence (that 
follows in the case studies) shows that over the years, the tripartite governance system 
does, in fact, reflect the interests of all three parties. 
By the end of the 1960s and the early 1970s, the export-oriented industrialization 
program had borne fruit. Foreign investment was booming, and GDP had almost doubled 
from S$3,970 million in 1968 to S$6,279 million in 1971,2 while unemployment declined 
from 7.3% to 4.8% during the same period (Chew and Chew 1998). With the economy 
almost at full employment, labor shortages arose in both skilled and unskilled arenas, 
although the government tried to ease the situation through the importation of foreign 
workers as well as encouraging people to work longer hours. The government was quite 
concerned that rising wages and labor shortages would check industrial growth. When 
these temporary measures did not work, and the tightness in the labor market made it 
impossible for voluntary wage restraint on the part of the unions, the government 
announced the formation of a tripartite wage forum to establish a national wage policy for 
the economy. 
The NWC (National Wages Council) was established as an advisory body to the 
government and an income policy was formally introduced in February 1972. The 
general terms of reference to the NWC were a) to assist in the formulation of general 
wage policy; b) to recommend necessary adjustments in wage structure, with a view to 
developing a coherent wage system with long-term economic and social development; 
and c) to advise on desirable incentive systems for the promotion of operational 
2
 Note that these figures are in Singapore dollars, while the figures in Table 1 are in US dollars. 
16 
efficiency and productivity in various enterprises (Liang 1988). The NWC is composed 
of five representatives of employers, five representatives of unions, and four 
representatives of government. The representatives of government include the permanent 
secretaries of the Ministries of Finance, Trade and Industry, Manpower, and the 
Chairman of the EDB. The Chairman of the NWC is a university professor (the first 
Chairman was Professor Lim Chong Yah, the current Professor Lim Pin). Chew and 
Chew (1998) suggest that the NWC has nurtured the ideology of accommodation and 
cooperation in Singapore generally, and it has helped promote the setting up of other 
tripartite institutions. More importantly, they claim that the NWC has promoted stable 
industrial relations. We will examine the NWC as one of the cases of tripartism in action 
in greater detail in the next section. 
Characterizing Tripartism in Singapore 
Changing Scope Tripartism in Singapore was limited in scope at the beginning: “The 
objective is to have an orderly annual wage adjustment, which takes the form of a real 
wage increase” (Yah 1998:28). From that relatively narrow scope in 1972, the objectives 
of the NWC have changed radically over time to reflect a broader view of its mandate 
(e.g. a focus on productivity and flexibility in the 1980s), and in practice, the NWC has 
been used for various restructuring goals of the Singapore government (these are 
discussed in greater detail in section 3). Besides, tripartism has grown beyond the NWC 
to other institutions and currently its overall scope is wide, concerning all matters of 
economic and social development, and has crept into common parlance on a day-to-day 
basis. As Wong (2004) notes tripartism has permitted trade union participation in a 
number of other economic and industrial institutions. Notably, these are most of the 
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important institutions governing economic and social development in Singapore. In 
addition, tripartism, and labor participation in NATIONAL economic decisions, is 
legitimated by the appointment of the General Secretary of the NTUC as a Minister 
without portfolio in the cabinet. 
Clearly Singaporeans see tripartism as having a broad scope. In an interview in 
2001, Lim Boon Heng suggests: 
“Tripartite representation is the norm, as exemplified by key bodies such as the 
National Productivity and Quality Council and the National Wages Council, and in the 
composition of the Boards of Directors managing key economic agencies such as the 
EDB, JTC, the Productivity and Standards Board and its advisory committees. Through 
such participation and deliberations, we have introduced several new initiatives under 
the Productivity Movement. These included schemes to encourage better company 
welfare such as the Company Welfarism through Employer's CPF Contributions or 
COWEC Scheme; the institution of joint labour-management consultation committees; 
and encouraging company stock option schemes. At the workforce level, the labour 
movement has been in the forefront to encourage workers to train for employability and 
to work with management to focus on achieving business excellence through the 
Integrated Management of Productivity Activities Programme or IMPACT. The National 
Trades Union Congress (NTUC) even has a Productivity Department, actively promoting 
productivity. Three of my union colleagues serve on the PSB Board.” 
And it is clear that tripartism is alive and vibrant even today. In 1998, for 
example, the new Manpower Policy (involving integrated planning, life-long learning and 
employability, national skills recognition systems, recruiting foreign talent, redefining 
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partnerships, improved work environments, and improved labor market information) was 
developed on a tripartite basis. In March 2005, for example, the government announced 
the Tripartite Job Re-Creation Program of REAP (Redeployment Assistance Program). 
Encompassingness and Representativeness The NTUC is the only labor federation in 
Singapore. It currently represents 63 unions (out of the 66 registered unions) consisting of 
470,000 members in Singapore at the current time, accounting for 97% of the labor 
movement. In that sense, it is broadly representative of the trade unions in Singapore. 
Whether it is broadly representative of labor and employees in Singapore is an open 
question, as Singapore’s union density figures are quite low (less than 16%), with 
collective bargaining coverage figures hovering around 18% in 1995. The SNEF 
(Singapore National Employers Federation) is the only employers federation in Singapore 
that exists for the purpose of tripartite collaboration and representation on industrial 
relations issues, broadly defined. The current SNEF, which has about 1,847 members 
(employing over 450,000 people), represents a 1980s merger between the National 
Employers Council and the Singapore Employers Federation. SNEF’s key objective, as 
stated on its website, is to strengthen the employers’ role in the tripartite partnership 
(www.snef.org.sg). 
Continuity and Institutionalization Tripartism has been in existence since 1972 in the 
shape of the NWC and has only grown in prominence, as noted above. And the number 
of institutions that are governed in some form of tripartite manner has increased over 
time. Officials publicly (and continually) tout the advantages of tripartism, while 
important leaders speak about tripartism and the dividends that it has brought. It is a key 
concept discussed on almost every Singaporean institution (labor, management, and 
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government) website. For example, on the website of the Singapore Manual and 
Mercantile Workers Union, one of the larger unions in Singapore, its secretary general, 
John De Payva writes: “as SMMWU, we actively promote tripartism to ensure a better 
standard of living for our workers” (www.smmwu.org.sg). And the website of the 
employers, SNEF says: “our key objective is to strengthen tripartism” (www.snef.org.sg). 
There is interaction between the tripartite actors on a regular basis in the various tripartite 
institutions. And as the evidence on the cases below will suggest, tripartism has had an 
impact on national economic decisions. It is also clear that the government values it 
highly. During the dispute between Singapore airlines and their pilots in 2003, Acting 
Manpower Minister Ng Eng Hen warned that the government had to protect the culture of 
tripartism (Asian Labor News 2003). 
Further, a number of today’s current problems are left to high-level tripartite “task 
forces” to resolve. For example, a tripartite committee has been studying ways to keep 
older Singaporeans in the workforce (Halima Yacob 2006). The positions of unions and 
employers were quite different on this issue. The unions argued that employers must 
change their attitudes towards the employment of older workers. Employers countered 
that older workers must be more adaptable, if they are to change their attitudes. The 
government chipped in a fund of S$30 million to provide incentives for employers to 
retrain older workers. The unions also argued that the retirement age should be increased 
from 62 to 64, which would give workers more time to contribute to their CPF pension 
savings. Although the employers were reluctant (they wanted to reduce wage costs), they 
reached a compromise …those workers over 62 who wanted to work until 64 were given 
the option to do so, and their case would be negotiated at the plant level. Most 
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importantly, the employers agreed to the unions demand for training of older workers. 
Another example is the tripartite committee on low-income workers. Tripartite solutions 
reached include a housing grant for first-time buyers, increased subsidies for childcare, 
and a special cash payment to low-income families (Halimah Yacob 2006). 
In summary, tripartism is quite deeply institutionalized as a governance 
mechanism in a variety of national economic institutions. 
South Korea 
Although South Korean tripartism is very closely associated with the Asian 
financial crisis (the social pact of 1998), there has been a history of failed efforts to create 
tripartite dialogue in South Korea. The economic planning board proposed a national 
wage council after the high wage increases of the post democratization years, but this was 
not supported. Later, the KTUC (a pre-cursor to the current KCTU), which was illegal at 
that time, proposed the formation of a National Economic and Social Council, which was 
formed and had a limited role, but did not address issues of wages. The presidential 
commission on industrial relations reform, established in 1996, invited the then illegal 
KCTU to join a tripartite process to discuss the future of labor law. This commission 
discussed various issues regarding labor law reform, but its recommendations were 
ignored by the government, which went on to craft its own legislation. The government’s 
new labor law legalized multiple unions (although it suspended its introduction for 3 
years), allowed political activity by unions, removed the prohibition of third party 
involvement in industrial relations and legalized the KCTU as a union federation (with 
effect from 1999). However, it did not please employers and unions. From the employer 
perspective, the revised labor law did not provide sufficient flexibility (particularly the 
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right to retrench workers). For unions, the law did not go far enough in extending the 
right to freedom of association to groups such as teachers and government employees. 
This by-passing of the commission, met with strikes and protests by labor leaders, 
leading to the decline of what was the first effort at tripartism in South Korea. 
As is well known, the Asian financial crisis sparked a more serious effort to create 
a tripartite arrangement in South Korea. What started out as an exchange rate crisis 
mushroomed into a full blown macro-economic crisis, bringing to light a number of 
structural weaknesses in the South Korean economy, notably in terms of financial 
transparency, corporate governance and the need for labor market flexibility (Harriss 
2002). When South Korea approached the IMF for relief, the IMF’s structural adjustment 
plan involved the enactment of tight monetary-fiscal policies, reform of corporate 
governance and labor market flexibilization, amongst other things. Harriss (2002) 
suggests that: “President Kim Dae-Jung, in order to allow the rapid change in 
expectations of the role of the state in economic crisis to come from a social consensus, 
created the European style tripartite consensus.” It is fair to note that there are multiple 
views about the genesis of the social pact. Some observers suggest that it was largely the 
brainchild of president KDJ, while others suggest that it was mooted by the KLI (Korea 
Labor Institute), and still others point out that the idea was also mentioned by leaders of 
the KCTU sometime earlier. 
It is also important to understand the sequence of events and the different and 
changing motivations of the parties to support the social pact. When the idea was first 
discussed in January 1998, both FKTU and KCTU were broadly supportive of the idea of 
policy consultation to deal with the crisis. During the 25 days of discussion in January it 
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gradually dawned on some KCTU leaders that an agreement that legitimized layoffs 
would be difficult to implement, but they still agreed to the social pact. At the KCTU 
delegates meeting on February 6th the delegates disagreed with the leaders and voted 
them out. The new leaders then led a wave of strikes to protest against the social pact. 
Thus, the idea of a social pact, which was supported in general by the leaders of 
all the groups, was actually terrain that was highly contested within groups. During the 
period from February to August 1998, much intra-organizational conflict and debate 
ensued within employer and union federations. As Baccaro and Lim (2006) note with the 
KCTU, white-collar unions wanted to participate in the tripartite commission because 
they wanted a seat at the table regarding issues relevant to them, i.e., banking and public 
sector restructuring. Large-company unions from both FKTU and KCTU grew 
increasingly opposed given that labor market flexibility (and the ability to layoff) was 
already agreed upon. The South Korean employers had no option but to join the tripartite 
agreement as they had no political support, and were seen by many as one of the primary 
causes of the crisis (Harriss 2002). However, Lee (2006), a member of the tripartite 
commission, notes that the initial differential interests within the labor movement only 
lasted for some time. 
Characterizing South Korean tripartism 
Scope The first tripartite agreement entered into during February 1998 was a social 
pact of far-reaching proportions. Harriss (2002) suggests that when the Government of 
President Kim Dae-Jung established the tripartite commission it was initially conceived 
of as a forum for the exchange of views regarding how to move forward out of the crisis. 
In the words of a recent chairman, Dr. Hong Shin, the commission was “a social 
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consensus-building institution grounded upon president KDJ’s national policies of the 
parallel development of democracy and market economy” (Harriss 2002). 
However, in real terms, the social pact that it reached was extremely wide in its 
scope. Although its focus was on five issues (preparation of a new framework for labor-
management relations, an agreement on welfare, growth and employment, wage 
payments for full-time union officials, reducing working hours per week to 40, and 
eliminating unfair labor practices), the final agreement reached on February 1998 was far 
in excess of these narrow topics. The scope of the social pact was wide, covering all 
aspects of the economy. Table 3 provides a list of the major topics, but it is important to 
note that each of these items had a long list of subtopics, over 90 in all. For a detailed 
listing of all sub-items, please see www.lmg.go.kr. 
Insert Table 3 about here 
Continuity and Institutionalization Despite the wide scope, South Korean tripartism 
does not appear stable or long lasting. Almost immediately after the agreement, the 
KCTU was unable to sell the pact to its delegates who voted against it by a huge margin: 
184-88. KCTU’s top leadership was thus forced to resign, and the KCTU commenced a 
wave of strikes in opposition to some of the pact’s articles. The government reached an 
agreement with KCTU to re-start tripartism in June 1998 (called the second tripartite 
commission), where the objective was to formulate detailed action plans on the various 
items in the social pact of February 1998. During this period, however, there was a steady 
increase in unemployment, from 2.5% before the crisis to 9% by the end of 1998 and 
early 1999.3 In the 12 months preceding early 1999 the registered unemployed ranks 
3
 These data differ slightly from the data in Table 1. The data in Table 1 are annual averages, while these 
are monthly figures. 
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rose by 1.3 million (Lee and Lee 2002). In 1998 alone, the manufacturing sector shed 
almost 600,000 jobs (Lee and Lee 2002). Actual employment dropped by 2 million since 
the beginning of the crisis. As the crisis wore on, it became apparent to workers that labor 
was going to bear much of the adjustment costs, particularly as banks and some large 
firms restructured their businesses. The banking sector reduced their workforce by as 
much as 32%. Faced with the assault on jobs, the KCTU continued its wave of strikes and 
by early 1999 formally withdrew from the tripartite commission. 
Meanwhile, the government had “institutionalized” the South Korean tripartite 
commission through legislation. This form of “institutionalization” did not provide the 
commission with any greater legitimacy, however. The KCTU was still formally “out” 
and it was clear that the employers (the KEF) were increasingly showing signs of wanting 
to “sabotage” the agreements. Harriss (2002) in his interviews with various members of 
the tripartite commission notes further that: “discussions within the tripartite commission 
apparatus indicated that the government’s representatives had little respect for organized 
labor as an institution and even less tolerance for its representatives on the TC”. Thus, 
although the tripartite commission continued its work (with the KCTU absent) and 
reached several agreements, especially the second social pact for job creation in 
December 2003 (with detailed agreements on 55 different items), there was a sense that 
much of this was orchestrated by government with relatively little input from labor (the 
FKTU was involved, and its voice heard, but played a relatively passive role). 
Encompassingness and Representativeness From the perspective of encompassingness 
and representativeness, it is hard to call South Korea’s tripartite commission 
representative. South Korean union density in 1997 was only 11.7%, while collective 
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bargaining coverage was about 17%. However, this low level of union density masks 
some differences. Union density in firms employing less than 100 employees was only 
1.1% in 2000, while union density at firms employing more than 300 workers was 70.9% 
(Lee and Lee 2003). Note that Baccaro and Lim (2006) report slightly different figures 
for union membership by size of establishment. However, the general conclusion that 
South Korean unionism is a large-firm phenomenon is inescapable (Kuruvilla 2006). 
Besides, since the KCTU was effectively “out” of the tripartite commission, it 
means that a significant number of trade union members were not represented. Lee and 
Lee (2002) suggest that FKTU has 4,501 unions representing 888,000 members 
approximately. The KCTU has many fewer unions (1,341) but they represent about 
570,000 members. Thus, 40% of labor union members do not have their voices heard in 
the tripartite commission. The FKTU also opted out of the tripartite commission in 2005, 
effectively bringing its short life to an end. The September 5th meeting of the tripartite 
commission (its 37th meeting) was attended by no union representatives. 
However, the saga is not over yet. Tripartism has been revived, yet again, in 
April 2006. The Chairman of the tripartite commission opened a plenary session that was 
attended by the KEF, FKTU and the representatives of the government (but not the 
KCTU). The agenda for the tripartite commission for 2006 is impressive, including 
follow-up measures for the establishment of legislation on non-regular workers; methods 
to improve systems for job creation in an aging society; ways to rationalize the 
bargaining system in the era of multiple unions (the above three agendas were decided at 
the Labor Relations Sub-Committee), building and activating local employment and 
human resource development systems; ways to activate the retirement pension system; 
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ways to strengthen the link between industrial demand, and education and training (above 
three decided at the Economy Sub-Committee); ways to rationalize government financial 
support for health insurance, introduction of a basic pension system to resolve the blind 
spot of the public pension system; ways to resolve the structural imbalance between the 
national pension and the pension for special occupations (above three decided by the 
Social Sub-Committee). In addition, 7 agreements, entered into last year were finally 
processed at this meeting. 
Therefore, from the perspective of representativeness, continuity and 
institutionalization, South Korean tripartism is considered by many to be a failed 
experiment. Harriss (2002) notes that at its inception, the tripartite commission worked 
well, since the country was in crisis, and the urgency for cooperative action was clear. 
However, as the crisis wore on, it became increasingly clear to organized labor that it was 
burdened with a large share of the adjustment. Others have argued that labor had 
relatively little voice in the evolution of labor policy, especially labor market flexibility 
since it was part of IMF conditionality. Joohee Lee (2004) argues that the prospects for 
the tripartite commission are not very bright, because it does not have an institutional and 
bargaining structure to support it. She argues that the success of the social pact will 
depend heavily on whether large-enterprise unions will comply with the promises made 
at the national level. However, she also notes that national and industry federations (such 
as the FKTU or KCTU) have always lacked authority over their member unions, 
especially in bargaining. Therefore, in her view, an essential building block of tripartism, 
an appropriate union and bargaining structure, is absent. BH Lee (2006) argues that weak 
union leadership, changing internal union politics and the lack of an appropriate structure 
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is a key problem. A key question that is raised by these developments is the issue of 
how we evaluate the tripartite commission’s work and effectiveness. One the one hand, 
the KCTU is still out. On the other hand, there are several agreements that are being 
completed here that could be seen as beneficial for the long-term development and 
restructuring of the South Korean economy after the financial crisis. Thus, although 
tripartism is a failure when viewed from the perspective of representativeness, it is also 
important to examine the impacts of the tripartite commission or rather, its effectiveness, 
in the context of the economic crisis, and the ability of the commission to generate 
policies that are beneficial to South Korean society, even if one union representing a 
significant minority of South Korean workers is absent. We turn to the issue of 
examining the connection between tripartism and economic restructuring in the next 
section. 
SECTION 3: THE EFFECT OF TRIPARTISM ON ECONOMIC RESTRUCTURING: 
CASES IN SINGAPORE AND SOUTH KOREA 
Singapore: Cases of Tripartism and Economic Restructuring 
Singapore Case 1: The 1972 Oil Crisis 
Table 4 presents the basic macro-economic picture before, and after the oil crisis. 
Insert Table 4 about here 
As Table 4 suggests, Singapore experienced the fate of all oil-importers. The oil 
crisis impacted Western economies in two ways (Euronavigator 2005): it severely 
exacerbated inflationary trends (the annual inflation rate in the UK soared to 20 %), and it 
siphoned off part of the wealth of all oil-importing countries, causing enormous budget 
deficits. In Western Europe, industrial production declined, impacting on traditional 
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sectors such as textiles, shipbuilding and steel, and unemployment rose, although some 
countries managed better than others. Singapore was also hit by the crisis, with rising 
prices, especially of food, which it imported completely. In response, the NWC first 
shortened the collective bargaining agreements from its fixed 3-5 years to 2-3 years, 
allowing some movement in wages. Further, the NWC also recommended wage increases 
over and above what was agreed upon in the existing collective bargaining agreements. 
Both these allowed the injection of greater flexibility in the system, while compensating 
employees for the rises in prices. In addition, the NWC, as an emergency response, 
recommended a S$25 per month increase for every employee. Since the average wage in 
Singapore was approximately S$360 per month, this represented a 6% increase. Finally, 
in 1974, the NWC recommended a second extra increase using a S$40+6% formula, in 
effect an increase of 17%. Table 5 shows the impact of these effects. Although there 
were real wage declines in 1973 and 1974, the declines were not by much, and by 1975 
there were increases in the real wage. Thus, workers standards of living did decline in 
the aftermath of the oil crisis, but not by much, compared to the rest of the world, and 
real wages revived much faster as well. 
Insert Table 5 about here 
Singapore Case 2: Tripartism and Economic Restructuring 
By 1978, the government’s economic development policies had resulted in 
considerable economic growth. Unemployment had fallen from a high of 4.7% to 3.6%. 
Labor productivity was high, as was the balance of payments situation, with foreign 
reserves growing at 27% over the previous year. Foreign direct investment into Singapore 
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continued to be high. The industrialization program was still labor intensive, however, 
and labor shortages were becoming apparent (Tan 1997). At the same time, Malaysia was 
becoming a preferred destination for low-cost electronics manufacture and China began 
opening up its Southern coast to foreign investment in 1978. Furthermore, Taiwan and 
South Korea were also more competitive than Singapore in light industrial manufactures. 
Under the circumstances, there was some degree of consensus amongst policy 
makers that economic restructuring towards higher value-added manufacturing was 
necessary (Yah 1998), since that was the only way to differentiate Singapore’s 
competitive advantage from those of other South and East Asian nations. And it must be 
done in ways that did not suddenly catapult Singapore as a high labor cost nation either. 
There had been much discussion regarding the use of the tripartite national wage council 
in economic restructuring, especially between the Chairman of the NWC, Lim Chong-
Yah, Albert Winsemis (Economic Advisor to the government) and the Chairman of the 
EDB, Mr. Ngiam Tong Dow. It was only after 1976 that the NWC was able to direct its 
focus to economic restructuring (Yah 1998). This tripartite mechanism was employed to 
move the economy up to higher value-added production and investment. 
In order to drive out low-cost investors and producers, the NWC recommended 
double-digit wage increases for 1979-1981. Nyau and Chan (1982:461) describe this as 
follows: “the NWC recommended wage increases of 20% and 19% in 1979 and 1980 
respectively, apart from recommending additional productivity linked bonuses of 3% for 
good performers.” These high wage increases helped drive out low-cost producers 
(Rodan 1991:145; Kuruvilla 1996). Simultaneously, the EDB granted generous fiscal 
and financial incentives to induce manufacturers to automate and engage in more capital-
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intensive investment. The government also increased the incentives for training, by 
establishing a skills development fund that required firms to contribute 4% of their wage 
bill, which could be recouped if they engaged in training. A key focus of the skills 
development fund was to encourage automation, mechanization and robotization, with 
the long-term objective of increased capital intensity. As Chew and Chew (1995) suggest, 
several policy changes were introduced to meet the needs of higher technology and 
capital-intensive investors. The education system was restructured in 1981. The new 
curricula emphasized secondary education, several vocational training institutes and 
polytechnics were opened, and a new university (the Nanyang Technical University) was 
established to provide foreign investors with skilled labor (Begin 1995). 
These high nominal wage increases did not translate into high real wage 
increases, since workers take-home pay was only increased by 3-4% during the 1979-
1981 years (Yah 1998). Rather, the significant portion of the wage increases was 
siphoned into the CPF (Central Provident Fund). The employees’ CPF contribution rate 
was increased from 16.5% to 18%, and then to 22% in 1981. The employers’ contribution 
was also raised from 16.5% in 1978 to 20.5% in 1979. 
The results of this movement into higher value-added industrialization, which 
began in 1980, are quite compelling. First, as Yong (1998) notes, capital input into the 
manufacturing sector grew at a phenomenal rate of 8.9% during the 1980-1985 period. 
Second, unit labor costs also grew steadily; real unit labor costs increased by 13.9% in 
1980-1985 (Yong 1998), forcing employers to increasingly substitute capital for labor. 
Third, labor productivity growth rates improved steadily during the 1980s, with an 
average growth rate of 5% during that decade (Tan 1997). And the growth in productivity 
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accounted for 55% of economic growth rates, compared to 45% in the decade of the 
1970s. Fourth, the sources of new employment in the 1980s were very different from that 
of the 1970s. Professional, technical and managerial workers formed a larger percentage 
of the workforce in the 1980s, while blue-collar workers declined from 40.4% of the 
workforce in 1980 to 35.3% in 1988 (although the percentage contribution of industry to 
GDP remained fairly constant during the same period!). Finally, the available information 
on foreign investment suggests that higher-quality Japanese investments appeared, 
expanding the manufacturing of semiconductors, disk drives, and computer assembly. 
The technological depth of foreign investments increased steadily, with many firms (for 
example, Motorola) locating higher-end processes and R&D services in Singapore (Salih, 
Young, and Rajah 1988). For more detail on the human resources aspects of this 
transformation, please see Tan (1997) and Kuruvilla et al (2002). 
Economic restructuring of the type noted above is an imperative for every 
economy in Asia, since there is a limit to just how much they can compete with the 
newest low-cost arrival, China. And every country has struggled with this process of 
industrial upgrading. In the South Korean case, these struggles took place after 
democratization in 1987. The opening up of China led to the urgent need for industrial 
upgrading in Taiwan. Malaysia has been successful in upgrading its electronics industry, 
helped by a tight labor market and rapidly rising wage costs. All of these countries did 
make the transition to higher valued-added manufacturing, over a period of time. Yet 
none of these countries exhibited the relatively smooth transition made by Singapore, 
which was facilitated by tripartism. The starkest contrast is provided by the Philippines, 
where the absence of effective tripartite mechanisms (where unions have a significant 
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voice) may have been the reason that the Philippines continues to be stuck in a low-cost 
competitive strategy. As Kuruvilla, Erickson, Ofreneo, Amante and Ortiz (2003) note: 
“The adoption of an export-oriented industrialization strategy in the 1970s was also 
accompanied by several repressive policies in the industrial relations domain under the 
Martial Law period of President Marcos. Thus, globalization was associated with a 
decline in labor power and voice, and an increase in employer power with a focus on 
enhancing workplace flexibility in an era where the Philippines competitive advantage 
was lower labor costs and an English-speaking workforce. The dual focus on export 
orientation and low labor costs forced an industrial relations regime that focused on the 
pursuance of lower costs and workplace flexibility. In the Philippine context, this 
invariably translated into efforts at increasing subcontracting, outsourcing, and union 
avoidance policies under an authoritarian regime. Although the more restrictive aspects 
of the martial law regime were lifted with the return to fully-functioning democracy after 
1986, Philippine industrial relations policy has maintained a low-cost focus. While there 
have been changes in labor legislation and labor rights, the fundamental character of both 
competitiveness as well as labor relations has remained unchanged, and in fact, has 
tended towards the direction of further increases in employer efforts to generate more 
flexible practices.” Thus, the Philippines is a country that did not have a MECHANISM 
to move into higher value-added economic development strategy, which the tripartite 
institutions afforded Singapore, permitting a very smooth adjustment to second stage 
EOI. 
Singapore Case 3: Tripartism and the 1985-1986 Recession Years 
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The 1985-1986 period was a time of recession in much of Asia. In 1984, the 
economic growth rate was 8.3%, but this fell sharply to -1.4% in 1985. A number of 
factors were responsible for the recession. There was a regional recession, caused by 
declines in oil prices and the slowdown in international demand, leading to falling prices 
for primary products such as tin, rubber, and palm oil. The decline in demand for 
semiconductors pushed Malaysia into a recession as well, and both South Korea and 
Taiwan were also similarly hit. Finally, there was a slump in property prices in 
Singapore. At the same time, prior actions of the NWC such as the skills development 
fund levy (4% of the wage bill) and the high employer contribution to the CPF (25% in 
1984) raised the costs of doing business for employers. 
The government was faced with two options. On the one hand, the country could 
live with a budget deficit and lower interest rates in order to raise domestic demand, an 
option that was not very viable given the small size of the domestic economy (Yah 1998). 
The other option was to reduce costs based on the argument that reducing costs would 
increase international demand, but also perhaps raise domestic investment. The tripartite 
solution reached through the NWC was as follows. First, corporate income taxes were cut 
from 40% to 33%. Second, the employers’ contribution to the CPF was cut from 25% to 
10%. And finally, the levy for the skills development fund was cut from 4% of wage bill 
to 1% of the wage bill. An old payroll tax of 2% was also removed. And finally, the 
NWC joined with the government to call for wage restraint. In 1986 and 1987, real gross 
wages declined by 3.9% per year. By 1987, real GDP growth had recovered to more 
“usual” figures, i.e., 9.7%. In return for these reductions in “costs”, the parties agreed to 
wage restraint for the next 2-3 years. 
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Most Asian countries faced a similar recession in 1985-1986. In Malaysia, 
nominal GNP fell by 12% in both years. Per capita GNP fell from $2,000 in 1984 to 
$1,600 in 1986. However, Malaysia's recovery from its recession began in late 1986, and 
improved commodity prices and strong growth in exports of manufactured goods led the 
recovery. The Malaysian government used the 1986-1987 recession as a basis for 
economic restructuring towards higher value-added investment. The new investment 
regime significantly encouraged higher value-added export-oriented industries, skill 
development and technology upgrading. In South Korea too, the 1985-1986 recession 
only caused a decline in real wages for one year. Thus, the recovery process in much of 
Asia was swift and it is hard to argue that the tripartite actions during this recession in 
Singapore facilitated the recovery process substantially, although it is to be noted that 
Malaysia and South Korea did not have the same tools at their disposal. But this was a 
recovery that was led by a rebounding market for semiconductors. Hence, more research 
is necessary to tease out the independent effect of tripartism in Singapore during this 
adjustment period, given the absence of similar actions in both Malaysia and South 
Korea. 
Yet, on the other hand, these changes served as a model for the creation of a 
longer-range flexible wage system that has enabled Singapore to react swiftly to crises. 
Although the Singapore economy was well on the road to recovery by mid 1987, the 
NWC continued to advocate wage restraint, and simultaneously continued to urge firms 
to accept the flexible wages policy. Essentially the NWC was advocating a basic wage 
structure that provided for increases up to 2% per year of service, an annual bonus of one 
month’s pay and a variable bonus based on productivity. The key here was that wages 
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should not increase faster than productivity growth, since that was essential for 
Singapore’s competitiveness (Anantaraman 1991:180-181). As will be apparent, the 
tripartite adjustment process during this crisis enabled the economy to react much better 
during the 1997 financial crisis, given the creation of a flexible wage system. 
Singapore Case 4: Tripartism and the Asian Financial Crisis 
The impact of the Asian financial crisis is well documented (see Betcherman and 
Islam 2001 for a detailed account). In Singapore, the GDP growth rate plummeted from 
8.5% in 1997 to -0.9% in 1998. Domestic consumption demand also weakened with 
plunging stock and property prices, falling incomes, and job retrenchments, while 
domestic investment demand was affected by excess capacity, economic uncertainties 
and tight liquidity. Although Singapore had been at full employment since the 1985-1986 
recession and was experiencing a labor shortage, the unemployment rate rose to 4.4% by 
December 1998. Retrenchments and job losses were concentrated in manufacturing, 
commerce and construction. The Singapore dollar depreciated against the US dollar by 
about 15%. However, the established tripartite arrangements also permitted a rapid 
response to the crisis. 
First, in 1998, the NWC recommended wage cuts of 5-8% in the total wage for 
1998, as compared with 1997. The guidelines recommended that the cuts should be 
achieved through the variable wage component. This was in addition to cuts in 
employers’ CPF contributions from 20% to 10% (Singapore Yearbook of Manpower 
Statistics 1998:19). Thus, employers were essentially provided with a saving of about 15-
18 % on wage costs, which allowed them to maintain competitiveness without laying off 
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too many workers. And, as several people argue, providing the employers with this 
“cushion” helped them ride out the crisis and helped the economy recover quickly. 
Further, the NWC recommended that companies performing very well or very poorly 
could deviate from this guideline. Since most companies had completed their negotiations 
and granted wage increases on the earlier part of the year, the NWC recommended that 
employers make larger cuts in the variable component of wages (including annual bonus) 
to offset the higher increases granted earlier. Thus, most of the adjustment should be in 
the variable component of wages (not the basic wage and annual increment). Finally the 
NWC held that employers should discuss with unions the quantum of the cut and how 
best to introduce it. 
Interestingly, past tripartite decisions to flexibilize wages, with the goal of 
roughly 20-30 % of wages being variable, helped in the implementation of the current 
decision, an important feature when evaluating the effects of tripartism. However, the 
“uptake” on the flexible wages idea in Singapore had been relatively slow, with only 47% 
of firms having adopted it prior to the crisis. And by 2000, the flexible component of 
wages had only reached 15-16%, up from 11% in 1997 (Channel News Asia 2004). The 
NWC had divided the variable portion into the annual variable component (normally the 
bonus paid at the end of the year) and monthly variable component (MVC) that was tied 
to productivity and profitability. This MVC was meant to give employers more flexibility 
and to save jobs in a downturn on a MONTHLY basis, thus providing considerable relief 
to those companies who had adopted it. 
Second, a tripartite panel, consisting of the three actors, the Economic 
development Board and the Productivity and Standards Board was created to examine the 
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retrenchment issue (by the first quarter of 1998, 16,000 workers had been retrenched). 
The panel recommended the implementation of two programs, the “'Retrenchment 
Advisory” program to advise employers on alternatives to retrenchment and the 
“Employment Assistance” program to assist retrenched workers find jobs quickly. 
The Retrenchment Advisory program offered employers several options to avoid 
retrenchments, such as sending the workers for skills training and upgrading under the 
Skills Redevelopment Programme (SRP); re-deploying the surplus workers to other work 
areas within the company; implementing shorter workweek or temporary lay-off; and 
implementing the flexible wage system recommended by the NWC. In particular, the 
SRP was a win-win and a union initiative (Halimah Yacob 2006). To defray the costs of 
retraining workers, companies would be given training grants of up to 80% of their 
course fees, subject to a maximum of $8.00 per trainee hour and a subsidy of absentee 
payroll up to 70% of the employees' salary, subject to a maximum of $4.20 per hour. 
Thus, there was a clear incentive to send workers for training, assuring the company of a 
better-trained and more efficient workforce in the longer term. The government allocated 
a sum of $50 million to the SRP fund to ensure that more people could be trained under 
the program. 
The tripartite recommendation for a shorter workweek as an adjustment 
mechanism was also limited to a two-month period, and had a cap on the amount of 
wages that companies must pay during this period. Finally, the tripartite commission 
recommended that those companies using the temporary layoff as a method of adjustment 
should not exceed one month, with the union to be consulted if it exceeded this duration 
(while the workers would be paid half their wages during the temporary layoff). 
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The Employment Assistance program, on the other hand, took a number of 
different steps. First, the various agencies and companies agreed to pool their job 
vacancies to enable the Ministry of Manpower to provide a more effective job placement 
service to the retrenched workers. Note that the SRP program referred to above also 
played a key role in the matching of skills with requirements. Thus, a low-skilled 
retrenched worker would be referred to an employer with vacancies in higher-skilled 
jobs. If the employer finds the worker suitable, the company would follow-up with the 
NTUC's Skills Development Department to place the worker on SRP. The employer 
would qualify for the training grants and subsidy for absentee payroll provided under the 
SRP. The tripartite commission also recommended a broadcasting mechanism to 
facilitate the re-employment of a large group of workers who are affected by 
retrenchment by broadcasting the profile of the retrenched workers to a pool of potential 
employers. Thus the two programs complemented each other effectively. The key result 
of these measures was that unemployment, which had reached 4.4% at the height of the 
crisis, was reduced back to 2.9% by December 1999. 
Singapore’s response was much more comprehensive than that of other countries. 
In the Malaysian case, a new institution, chaired by the Prime Minister, called the 
National Economic Action Council (NEAC), was created. It was a multipartite 
institution, with labor, via the two major labor federations, CUEPACS and MTUC 
involved. And it was clear that the MTUC’s voice was heard….since the NEAC first 
announced a wage freeze and suspended collective bargaining over wages, the MTUC 
was able to convince the council to desist from that policy. However, tripartism did not 
continue after the crisis. The National Labor Advisory Council, a tripartite consultative 
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body, drew up guidelines for retrenchment with a view to ensuring that the procedures 
were equitable, while highlighting alternatives to retrenchments (Campbell 2001). 
Although tripartism in Thailand via the National Wage Committee (which sets the 
minimum wage) and the National Labor Development Advisory Council (NLDAC) was 
in evidence during the crisis, Campbell (2001) notes that tripartism in Thailand is only 
“as strong as its constituent parts” and with a fragmented labor movement, and union 
density of about 2%, tripartism is not that effective. The crisis also revitalized, briefly, 
tripartism in the Philippines, a country with a highly-fragmented labor movement. A 
national social accord was produced, but as Erickson et al. (2003) suggest, it was not very 
effective in keeping retrenchments low. 
Summary 
In summary, tripartism has had notable effects on the adjustment processes 
following economic downturns in Singapore. In addition, it has solved other specific 
problems. For example, when turnover due to labor shortages was very high, the NWC 
recommended not paying the year-end bonus (a legal requirement) to employees who 
resign during the course of the year, which brought down the rate of job-hopping. In 
addition, the NWC has been instrumental in raising the retirement age in Singapore. 
Perhaps the biggest contribution of the NWC is in the central reason for its formation: 
over the years it has created a much more flexible wage regime in Singapore. For a 
detailed examination of the impact of the NWC, please see Yah and Chew (1998). Apart 
from these practical outcomes, it is also important to evaluate tripartism from the 
perspective of the overall “flexibility” and “responsiveness” it provides the Singapore 
economy. Tripartism is one more lever that the government has to allow Singapore to 
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adapt smoothly to changes in the economic environment. Thus, tripartism in Singapore 
clearly has had an impact in terms of “efficiency.” 
However, we also argue that tripartism has had an equal impact on equity. This is 
best exemplified by the response to the Asian financial crisis (case 4) that shows that 
Singapore’s response was perhaps the most “worker friendly” in Asia, in that it tried to 
minimize job loss and maximize retraining and employability. Moreover, there is 
tripartite influence in Singapore’s “welfare state.” The Central Provident Fund, which is 
managed by a tripartite board, provides a range of benefits. Each person has a CPF 
account that is composed of four sub-accounts. The first sub-account can be used to 
finance a home, finance education, for certain approved investments and insurance. The 
second sub-account is primarily for the purpose of old age provisions (pension). The third 
sub-account is a medisave account, to be used for hospital treatment, selected outpatient 
services and catastrophic medical insurance, while the fourth sub-account is a retirement 
account, which finances periodic payments to the individual after age 62. The provident 
fund system thus covers (partially in some cases) the following “welfare” issues: old age 
benefits, retirement benefits, medical insurance, permanent disability benefits, maternity 
care, and survivor benefits. Work injuries are however covered by the employer (via an 
insurance system). 
Note that Singapore’s social security system is an individualized defined 
contribution scheme, financed primarily through employers and employees contributions. 
As the cases above have shown, the tripartite actors have often temporarily reduced the 
employer’s contribution to the CPF to provide some cost relief in hard times (e.g. the 
Asian financial crisis), but normally, roughly 30-40% of an employee’s income is saved 
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every month through the CPF system, as Table 6 indicates. The contributors to labor 
force ratio was 70.9% in 1983 and 62% in 1999; the remainder being foreign workers, 
which account for nearly a quarter of the workforce, and the self-employed (Asher & 
Karunarathne 2001). Unions are now trying to insist that there is a need to enhance the 
return of the fund (currently, the fund guarantees a 2.5-4% return on its investments) and 
have for some time argued for increasing medical coverage. 
Insert Table 6 about here 
It is important to note that over 90% of Singaporeans own their own homes, 
thanks to the financing from the CPF system (they borrow from the CPF). As Ngian Tong 
Dow, Chairman of the CPG board said in 2000: “Many Singaporeans have used their 
CPF savings to buy their homes and today about 90% of Singaporeans own their own 
homes. We are one of the highest home-ownership nations in the world.” On the other 
hand, some authors like Asher and Karunarathne (2001:9) argue that Singapore’s social 
security faces limitations, including “inadequate balances at retirement, lack of inflation 
and longevity protection, lack of survivors’ benefits, and virtual absence of tax-financed 
redistributive tier.” 
Thus, the CPF system provides a system of welfare, with the added bonus that it 
promotes home ownership. It is a form of welfare that is very different from the 
prevailing “European conceptions of welfare.” 
In addition to the CPF system, tripartite governance of many different institutions 
has led to many positive trends on social issues over time. For example, unemployment 
has remained fairly steady after the spurt caused by the Asian financial crisis, averaging 
4% in 1999-2004. During the period 1990-1997, real wages increased by 4.7% annually 
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(nominal wages increased by 7.2%), and per capita GDP increased in real terms by 5% 
(Singapore Department of Statistics 1998). While 90% of Singaporeans witnessed an 
increase in average household income during this period, the bottom 10% showed a 
decline of 1.8% (Singapore Department of Statistics 1998). However, that does not mean 
that these households are poor. Home ownership data show that roughly three-fifths of 
these households lived in HDB 3-bedroom flats, which is comparable to the national 
average. Although there appears to be no one living below the national poverty line in 
Singapore, measures of relative poverty, a higher standard than the poverty line, indicate 
that it is low in Singapore. Roughly 340,000 people had a per capita household income of 
less than half the median income, of which 100,000 were children. This compares very 
well to the other “rich” city state of Hong Kong, where 700,000 people are “relatively 
poor.” 
Income inequality has increased somewhat in recent years, however. In 1980, the 
Gini coefficient was 0.48. This declined to 0.436 in 1990, increased slightly to 0.44 in 
1992, and remained steady at 0.44 until the Asian financial crisis (Singapore Department 
of Statistics 1998). But it then rose to 0.481 in 2000 (Singapore Department of Statistics 
2002). 
Another bit of evidence on the positive social impact of tripartism can be seen in 
the increase in training. The tripartite skills development fund, which forces employers to 
invest in training, has resulted in a steady increase in the training budgets of firms. 
Kuruvilla, Erickson and Huang (2002) report that each Singaporean employee had at 
least 40 hours of training per year in 1998, an increase from 34 hours in 1995. 
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Thus we would argue that Singapore’s tripartism, while rather unique when compared to 
the other examples in this volume, meets both efficiency and equity goals. 
South Korea: Tripartism and Economic Restructuring during the Asian crisis 
Evaluations of the effectiveness of South Korean tripartism in terms of its ability 
to mediate the nature, sequencing and policies connected with economic restructuring and 
reform are difficult given that there was only one general agreement which was signed by 
all of the parties. Since that agreement, the tripartite commission has largely been focused 
on “fleshing out” different aspects of the agreement, and during this process, the KCTU 
has been more “out” than “in” and even the FKTU has been waffling regarding their 
participation. It is close to impossible to show a clear causal effect of the pact on 
important outcomes such as the sequencing, timing, intensity, and outcomes of reform. 
What we hope to do in this section is to examine several different aspects of the pact and 
its implementation in order to assess the impact of tripartism. The evidence for different 
aspects we examine is, at best, circumstantial, and with some comparisons with “shadow” 
cases, suggestive, but definitely not conclusive. Note further that while the South Korean 
tripartite agreement was very wide in scope, we are looking here at only some of its 
provisions. What these aspects show is some attempt at reconciliation of both efficiency 
and equity. 
Pace of Recovery and Stability 
The key argument here is that the Feb 1998 tripartite agreement in South Korea 
was “fundamental” in general terms to South Korea’s extremely quick recovery from the 
Asian financial crisis. The “V’ shaped curve before and after the crisis, it can be argued 
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(and is) has to do with the overall stability that the tripartite agreement brought, 
particularly since it signaled to foreign investors and the IMF that the South Korean 
government was serious in terms of various reforms, since there was tripartite support for 
it. And tripartite support ensured that the process of adjustment would be achieved with 
relatively little social unrest. Thus, the stability provided by the agreement was an 
important issue. Lee (2006) talks about the “symbolic” meaning of the pact—i.e. it 
represented social consensus at a time when it was desperately needed. 
There is considerable evidence that South Korea led the other countries in terms 
of the rapidity of GDP recovery, exchange rate recovery and the building up of foreign 
reserves. Further, South Korea stopped drawing from the IMF, and paid back its standby 
drawings nine months ahead of schedule. By the end of 2000, capital flows had reversed, 
with a net inflow of capital, and foreign direct investment started increasing as far back as 
1998 itself. Most critically, by 1999, South Korean GDP growth rate had climbed to 
9.5%, consistent with the pattern before the crisis. It was 4.6% in 2004. The comparative 
picture is provided in Table 7 below. 
Insert Table 7 about here 
Thus, the pace of economic recovery in South Korea has been widely attributed to 
the stability and commonality of purpose that the tripartite framework agreement 
provided. As Michel Camdessus noted in a speech in Dec 2, 1999: 
“we have learned that, when crisis strikes and a response is formulated, it is not 
just the content of a program that matters, but the degree of support for it. It need 
hardly be said that a program will work only if the country wants it to work; not 
just the government, but the people and organizations within the society. In short, 
we have seen the value of national ‘ownership’ of the policies, through a 
participatory approach that engages civil society in a constructive dialogue. The 
tripartite accord agreed by labor, business, and government in February 1998 
was a landmark event in South Korea's recovery. Equally the unity that was 
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established across interest groups and across regions in the early stages of the 
response to the crisis is an invaluable asset that should not be given up easily” 
(World Bank website). 
Labor Market Flexibility and Economic Recovery 
As several authors have argued, the tripartite agreement was a historic 
compromise that attempted to settle many unsettled issues in the labor relations realm. 
One such issue that settled concerned labor market flexibility. Under the agreement, 
employers are allowed to dismiss employees for urgent managerial reasons and needs. 
Transfers, mergers and acquisitions of business will be regarded as urgent managerial 
reasons. The agreement also provides that companies should exert every effort to avoid 
the dismissal of workers. There are clauses regarding the method to be followed in such 
cases, which include discussions with the union regarding methods undertaken to avoid 
dismissal, 60 days advance notice to employees and labor administration offices, rational 
and fair standards to be used in how employees are selected for dismissal, and employers 
are obliged to rehire dismissed workers if they need additional employees. What the 
agreement did was to legitimize layoffs in big firms that had hitherto provided a high 
degree of employment security. The argument advanced by Koo and Kiser (2001) is that 
employers, acting on this agreement, began to layoff, and that helped them recover 
relatively quickly, and therefore, South Korean recovery is strongly linked to the tripartite 
agreement concerning labor market flexibility. 
Clearly, employers seem to have acted on this agreement almost immediately. 
There was a 20% reduction in employment between the fourth quarter of 1997 and the 
first quarter of 1999. Each quarter, roughly 400,000 South Korean jobs were lost. By the 
end of the first quarter of 1999, the workforce had declined from 21.1 million in 1997 to 
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19 million. The fall in employment is almost completely attributable to job losses in 
manufacturing and construction, which accounted for 90%, and retail trade and banking 
accounted for the balance (Kang, Keum, Kim, and Shin 2001). And of the loss in 
manufacturing jobs 70% were regular workers, while the rest were temporary workers. 
On a comparative basis, South Korea and Thailand had the highest number of 
redundancies, with over a quarter of employers declaring an employment decrease of 
over 25%. Overall, the unemployment rate, which had showed an annual average of 
2.4% during the 1992-1997 period, jumped to 8.4% during the first quarter of 1999. 
Similarly, the labor force participation rate declined from 62.2% that year to 58.6% in 
1999. Clearly, therefore, employers took immediate steps to cut manpower. In addition, 
the tripartite agreement also legalized the use of temporary workers. 
Koo and Kiser (2001) argue that the reduction in labor costs helped companies 
with heavy debt to survive, at a time when commercial banks were in trouble and could 
not provide finance. They also argue that once the companies survived the crisis, their 
higher profits as a result of lower labor costs helped re-vitalize the equity market. The 
key is the evidence to back up this claim. Koo and Kiser suggest two different pieces of 
evidence. First, they cite data regarding employment costs per worker. Real employment 
cost per worker in the manufacturing sector decreased by 6.8% during the crisis, while at 
the same time, real value added per worker increased by 6.4%. Given the wage restraint, 
(in fact a wage reduction as many companies cut wages), productivity growth was faster 
than wage growth, resulting in a drop in unit labor costs of 28% from 1997 to 2000 (Koo 
and Kiser 2001). We use here a US Bureau of Labor Statistics Database to come up with 
similar results, which are summarized in Figure 1. 
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Insert Figure 1 about here 
What Figure 1 shows is that South Korean companies obtained a very high degree 
of labor cost abatement during the financial crisis, compared to other countries. Koo and 
Kiser (2001:33) also note that the 1998 wage cuts and job losses, which were on an 
unprecedented scale, were accomplished without the social conflict that could be 
expected in a nation with militant trade unions. Their claim that the reduction in costs and 
increase in productivity during the Asian financial crisis aided the more rapid recovery of 
many individual firms appears persuasive, but cannot be evaluated more quantitatively, 
given the various South Korean government actions regarding capital, credit and equity 
markets that were also taken at the same time. Clearly, the employment flexibility 
provisions of the tripartite agreement were taken advantage of by employers, and 
provided them considerable financial relief. 
Labor Market Policies 
While labor market flexibility promoted “efficiency” there is much in the 
tripartite agreement that attempts to promote “equity” as well. The social pact in 1998 
and the various agreements reached by the tripartite commission in South Korea have 
spawned a wide variety of labor market and welfare programs, the breadth, depth and 
intensity of which has not been achieved by other countries affected by the crisis. Clearly 
the items in the agreement reflect labor’s voice in the process. This is perhaps the 
strongest case that can be made that tripartism affects the mix and intensity of reforms, 
but the case is made with comparative evidence. 
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The range of labor market policies adopted as a result of the social pact is large 
and provided below. Specific details of these various provisions can be found in the 
tripartite social pact. 
a) Expansion and improvements in the employment insurance system, including 
extension of coverage to employees employed in small business and part-time 
workers 
b) Support for retired and unemployed workers 
c) Expansion of job placement services 
d) Expansion of vocational training 
e) Job creation policies 
f) Extension and consolidation of the social security system 
g) Reduction of working hours 
h) Expansion of the national pension system 
i) Expansion of public works programs 
In contrast, the other countries such as Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand and the 
Philippines do not have such a range of policies. For example, only Thailand and 
Indonesia embarked on public works programs, but not Malaysia or the Philippines. 
South Korea is the ONLY country to have introduced an unemployment insurance 
program. South Korea also expanded severance pay programs. In the arena of vocational 
training, South Korea made the largest changes, with the largest amount of funding for 
those changes. South Korea has established labor market information systems through its 
employment security centers that have been used extensively by the population. Finally 
South Korea has provided more wage subsidies targeted at vulnerable groups such as 
women and youth. A comparative survey of the crisis hit countries by Horton and 
Mazumdar (2001) clearly shows South Korea’s leadership here, and no other crisis-hit 
country has embarked on such a long list of programs as outlined above. Thus, the social 
pact did clearly affect the nature (mix and intensity) of the reforms, and attempted to 
reconcile equity and efficiency. 
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Despite South Korea’s tripartite attempts to reconcile efficiency and equity from a 
relative (comparative) standpoint, in absolute terms we must note that there are some 
limitations…such as the narrow coverage of the social security system. Whereas the 
proportion of wage and salary earners eligible for South Korea’s Employment Insurance 
System (EIS) increased to nearly 85% in 2004, the proportion of those actually insured 
was much lower, at 54.2% (Jones 2005). There has also been a large increase in the 
numbers of non-regular (temporary) workers, which accounted for 29.7% of employees 
in 2004 (Jones 2005). Although South Korea has done more for its workers than the 
other crisis-hit countries, it has not been able to reverse the negative impact of the Asian 
financial crisis on income inequality, which rose from 0.332 in 1995 to 0.389 in 2000. 
Privatization and the pace of reform 
We use this example to show that tripartism affects the pace of reform as well, not 
only the pace of recovery. In many other countries, tripartism has served to slow the pace 
of economic reform and restructuring, particularly in order to protect workers interests. In 
South Korea, however, tripartism actually served to hasten the pace of privatization, and 
in that sense is a contrarian example. 
Privatization of state-owned industries was not one of the major nine points in the 
tripartite social pact of 1998 in South Korea, but privatization has been under the purview 
of the tripartite commission via its Special Committee on Public Sector Restructuring, 
which has reached several agreements, such as the agreement on manpower reduction in 
the postal and communication sector (August 2000), and the agreement on the break-up 
of Korea Electric Power Corporation. What is clear, however, is that South Korea, since 
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the Asian financial crisis, has embarked on privatization at a speed that far outstrips the 
other crisis-hit Asian countries. 
As of March 1998, there were 108 SOEs (state-owned enterprises) in South 
Korea, employing 213,000 people and with budgets reaching 1000 trillion won. 
Collectively, these firms are responsible for about 8-9% of GDP. Most of these 
companies enjoy monopoly and market dominance. The South Korean government’s 
approach to privatization has mostly emphasized government disinvestment. However, 
prior to the Asian financial crisis, efforts at privatization were not successful. A detailed 
account of privatization in South Korea can be found in 
http://ftc.go.kr/data/hwp/apec200103.htm from where much of this information is taken. 
According to South Korean government data, there had been four rounds of privatization 
of SOEs, in 1968, 1980, 1987, and 1993. In 1987, the government stake in Korea Electric 
Power Corp. and Pohang Iron and Steel Co. were put up for sale in the open market, but 
these efforts failed to produce substantial results due to the sluggish stock market. In 
1993, the government pursued the privatization of 58 SOEs and consolidation of 10 
SOEs, focusing on management accountability. The 1993 measure also failed to attain the 
intended goals, faced with stiff resistance from unions. 
The Asian financial crisis and the consequent reforms in capital markets, credit 
markets, equity markets, and corporate governance that followed from the social pact 
paved the way for pursuing public sector reform more aggressively. Although 
privatization was the bailiwick of the steering committee on privatization of SOEs in the 
Ministry of Planning and Budget, specific issues have been addressed by the Special 
Committee on Public Sector Restructuring of the tripartite commission, which provides a 
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forum and a basis for tripartite input into these government decisions. The reform plan of 
the Ministry of Planning and Budget focuses heavily on four sectors: railway, power, gas, 
and telecoms. Tripartite agreements have been reached on some aspects of manpower 
reduction in railways and the break up of Korea Power’s distribution business. 
Furthermore, privatization and disinvestment of large scale and very important 
companies have proceeded at a rapid pace in South Korea. The list includes such 
luminaries as Korea Telecom, Pohang Iron and Steel Co., Korea Heavy Industries, 
Professional Korea Chemicals, Korea Technology Banking Corporation, Korea Electric 
Power Corporation and Korea Gas. Thus significant progress has been made in the case 
of eight out of eleven large SOEs in South Korea after the financial crisis. 
The pace of reform in other countries has been much slower, although like in 
South Korea, privatization has been on the agenda for some time. Singapore, which 
perhaps had the largest share of its economy in the hands of government companies prior 
to 1985, has gradually and steadily privatized. Malaysia, with over 1,156 SOEs in 1990 (a 
third of which were unprofitable), had only privatized 474 projects by December 2003. 
Thailand, with 59 SOEs at the time of the financial crisis (of which 22 were loss making), 
has experienced significant delays, particularly with EGAT (the electricity generating 
authority of Thailand). In Indonesia, there was a significant lack of support for 
privatization and it has been delayed once the Iraq crisis began. 
Thus, what the tripartite commission has done in South Korea is that it provided a 
forum for the discussion of privatization and public sector reform that has not been 
available to other countries. Yet, the relatively spectacular progress on privatization in 
South Korea cannot be solely laid at the existence of a tripartite institution or mechanism. 
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Summary 
In summary, there is some support for the idea that the tripartite peak level 
agreement reached in South Korea was, in a general way, partly responsible for the 
relatively quick emergence out of the crisis, particularly in terms of the stability it 
provided, the sense of unified collective purpose it signified, and the resulting increase in 
confidence that it provided capital markets. The social pact clearly contributed to the 
speed of the recovery, for example, through the labor flexibility agreement that offered 
firms considerable fiscal relief, and through other efficiency enhancing mechanisms. On 
the equity side, compared to the other crisis countries, the tripartite agreement in South 
Korea produced a comprehensive set of labor market policies. Finally, it is important to 
note that it was critical in solving a number of outstanding labor law issues that have been 
in dispute for several years. As a result of the agreement, much of the building blocks of 
the South Korean industrial relations system are established and settled. Long-standing 
issues such as the bargaining structure (including industry level bargaining), the right of 
public sector employees and teachers to unionize and bargain, the ability of firms to 
layoff, multiple unionism, and whether union leaders would continue to be paid by the 
employers were all settled through tripartism. These have been contentious issues since 
the early 1990s. 
The key negative aspect of South Korean tripartism is that the labor pillar it stands 
on is very weak, in that only one part of the labor movement supports it. Although there 
is an effort underway to revive the tripartite commission currently, it is not clear that the 
KCTU will join it (this depends heavily on internal union politics and the relative power 
of the moderates and the radicals). Thus, tripartism in South Korea is unstable, and not 
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fully representative, yet it has some impact on the mix of economic reforms, and the pace 
of economic recovery. One final point: even though the KTUC is not participating, the 
tripartite commission is continuing its work, and reaching agreements about a range of 
issues (several not directly related to labor interests) that are arguably good for South 
Korean society as a whole. 
SECTION 4: CONCLUSIONS 
The purpose of this paper is to examine the impact of tripartism on the nature, 
mix, timing, sequencing and outcomes of economic reform. In general, the case studies 
in Singapore provide fairly strong evidence of the impact of tripartism on economic 
reforms generally, and specifically on the policy mix. The examples from South Korea 
are strongly suggestive that tripartism does have an impact, especially in engendering a 
degree of stability when it was needed, and in the pace of reform as well as the policy 
mix. However, in the South Korean case there is an inherent difficulty in linking a one-
time event to a broad range of continuing economic reform policies and outcomes. 
The overarching question about the impact of tripartism on reforms included 
some specific research questions. The first question is whether tripartism makes reforms 
more sustainable and credible through buy-in from key social actors. The evidence from 
South Korea both confirms and disconfirms this hypothesis. On the one hand, tripartism 
definitely provided stability and facilitated a rapid economic recovery because of buy-in 
from all of the social partners. However, that buy-in was short-lived, as it was contested 
by one branch of the labor movement, raising questions about the continued credibility of 
various reform elements. The evidence from Singapore is completely consistent with this 
hypothesis, and over a long time frame. 
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A second research question (or hypothesis) is whether tripartism produces reforms 
that reconcile efficiency and equity. Evidence from both cases confirms this hypothesis 
quite firmly. The efficiency enhancing labor flexibility policies in South Korea were 
balanced to some degree by equity enhancing labor market and social welfare policies. In 
the Singapore case, the concerns with both efficiency and equity are apparent in the 
responses to various crisis….but the ability to reconcile efficiency and equity was 
facilitated considerably by the unique institutions in Singapore, i.e. specifically, the 
existence of the Central Provident Fund, and the deep institutionalization of tripartite 
decision making in many different spheres. 
A final research question is whether tripartism increases maneuvering room for 
national policy-makers vis a vis international actors. There is insufficient evidence in the 
two cases to confirm or disconfirm this question. 
How best do we judge the tripartite experiences of Singapore and South Korea? 
Schmitter and Grote (1997) suggest that corporatist arrangements are known to result in 
non-inflationary wage settlements along with enhanced social safety net policies, and 
stable taxes and spending arrangements. The basic goal of corporatist welfare policy is 
security and stability. This statement is based on the experience of several Western 
European countries over the period of the 1970s to the 1990s. Whether the statement 
applies today in Western Europe is highly debatable. Singapore is now as wealthy as the 
Western European nations, and meets several aspects of Schmitter and Grote’s 
conception, such as the non-inflationary wage settlements, but on other dimensions, such 
as social safety net policies, does not. Yet, Singapore has achieved a high degree of 
stability, a reasonably high degree of security via job growth, retirement benefits and 
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labor market policies, and a high degree of flexibility. South Korea cannot claim to have 
achieved the high degree of stability and security suggested by Schmitter, and its 
tripartite institutions are not stable. Harriss (2002) uses Katzenstein’s argument to 
characterize South Korean tripartism in that it “failed to achieve the voluntary 
cooperative regulation of conflicts over economic and social issues through highly 
structured and interpenetrating political relationships between business, labor and 
government.” Singapore’s experience is more consistent with Katzenstein’s conception 
of corporatism. 
South Korean tripartism, however, seems to conform more to Rodrik’s view that 
democratic institutions contribute to short-term stability. Rodrik (1999) argues that 
democratic governance facilitates the development of institutions that produce greater 
short-term stability, ease adjustment to adverse shocks, and deliver superior distributional 
outcomes. Yet, South Korean tripartism has actually contributed to a widening of income 
inequality (a consequence of firms adjustment policies that increased the number of 
temporary employees in many industries). Singapore, while consistent with Rodrik’s 
short-term stability argument, evidences stability over the longer term as well, especially 
in that it has created a path to smooth adjustment to a series of economic shocks, and has 
done that fairly consistently over time. 
Finally, there is the question of what conditions give rise to strongly 
institutionalized tripartism. Baccaro and Lim (2006) argue that social pacts evolve when 
governments lack the institutional and electoral resources to deal with the crisis 
unilaterally (governments are weak). For such a pact to be stable, they argue that there 
must be strategic commitment on the part of the unions, and it is generally the moderate 
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trade unions that support a pact. Continued stability, institutionalization, and replication 
of social pacts depend heavily, in their opinion, on sustained employer commitment as 
well. Thus, per their thesis, South Korean tripartism arose due to the presence of a weak 
government during a macro-economic crisis. However, South Korean tripartism is 
unstable because not all unions supported it uniformly, and even employers began to lose 
interest after awhile. Thus, South Korea fits well into Baccaro and Lim’s (2006) 
argument, although Singapore does not. In the Singapore case, while the macro-
economic crisis in 1968 was an important impetus to the development of the tripartite 
arrangement, its institutionalization over time has been due to a strong government that 
has engendered employer and union commitment to tripartism. 
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Table 1 Major Indicators of Singapore’s Economic Growth 1960-2004 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
GDP 
per 
capita 
(US$) 
2203 
2425 
2358 
2503 
2453 
2675 
2891 
3172 
3541 
3960 
4434 
4876 
5432 
5924 
6179 
6336 
6694 
7116 
7626 
8239 
8926 
9335 
9570 
10253 
10900 
10727 
10969 
11854 
12866 
13732 
14401 
14938 
15465 
16925 
18271 
19152 
GDP 
(US$b 
) 
3.6 
4.1 
4.1 
4.5 
4.5 
5.1 
5.6 
6.3 
7.1 
8.1 
9.2 
10.3 
11.7 
13 
13.8 
14.3 
15.3 
16.5 
18 
19.6 
21.5 
23.6 
25.3 
27.5 
29.8 
29.4 
30 
32.9 
36.6 
40.2 
43.9 
46.8 
50 
56.1 
62.5 
67.5 
GDP 
growth 
(%) 
-
13.8 
0 
8.9 
0.6 
11.7 
10.8 
12.2 
13.6 
13.6 
13.7 
12 
13.4 
11.1 
6.1 
4.1 
7.1 
7.8 
8.5 
9.4 
9.7 
9.7 
7.1 
8.5 
8.3 
-1.4 
2.1 
9.7 
11.3 
9.9 
9 
6.8 
6.7 
12.3 
11.4 
8 
CPI 
(%) 
-
0.4 
0.4 
2.2 
1.7 
0.2 
2 
3.3 
0.7 
-0.3 
0.5 
1.8 
2.1 
19.6 
22.4 
2.5 
-1.8 
3.2 
4.9 
4.1 
8.5 
8.2 
3.9 
1.2 
2.6 
0.5 
-1.4 
0.5 
1.5 
2.3 
3.5 
3.4 
2.3 
2.3 
3.1 
1.7 
Gross 
domestic 
savings 
(%) 
8.8 
22.5 
-34.5 
-36.5 
-74 
9.9 
13.7 
13.7 
18.3 
18 
18.4 
18.9 
24.6 
29.3 
29.1 
29.4 
32.6 
33.5 
34 
36.3 
38.1 
41.3 
44 
46.5 
46.3 
40.6 
38 
37.9 
41.1 
43 
43.3 
45.1 
45.5 
45.2 
48 
50.2 
Gross 
capital 
formation 
(%) 
9.7 
14 
15.5 
17.1 
21.9 
21.9 
22 
22.2 
24.9 
28.6 
38.7 
40.6 
41.4 
39.4 
45.3 
39.9 
40.8 
36.2 
39 
43.4 
46.3 
46.3 
47.9 
47.9 
48.5 
42.5 
37.6 
37.7 
34 
34.7 
36.4 
34.5 
35.8 
37.4 
33.1 
34.1 
Trade 
balance 
(US$m) 
-533 
-608 
-571 
-704 
-651 
-760 
-657 
-909 
-1170 
-1392 
-2619 
-3016 
-958 
-1140 
-1860 
-2030 
-1790 
-1480 
-1970 
-2200 
-2970 
-4690 
-5180 
-4360 
-2640 
-1520 
-940 
-1140 
28 
-313 
-1630 
-110 
-1820 
-2720 
1350 
6450 
Exports 
(US$m) 
3620 
3437 
3595 
4060 
3448 
3799 
4249 
4415 
4914 
5953 
6132 
6909 
2170 
3599 
5906 
5481 
6654 
8245 
10123 
14248 
19430 
21090 
21016 
21894 
24091 
23187 
22738 
29096 
40703 
45700 
54679 
61333 
66565 
77858 
97919 
129557 
Foreig 
n debt 
(US$ 
m) 
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
2071 
2263 
2629 
2803 
3928 
4207 
3587 
3896 
3842 
4197 
3772 
4369 
4582 
5524 
7594 
8368 
FDI 
(US$m) 
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
141 
327 
310 
254 
186 
206 
186 
669 
1138 
1675 
1298 
1085 
1210 
809 
1529 
2630 
3537 
2004 
3541 
4361 
887 
2534 
3973 
7156 
Unemploy 
-ment (%) 
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
8.2 
-
4.7 
4.4 
3.9 
4.5 
4.4 
3.9 
3.6 
3.3 
3.5 
2.9 
2.6 
3.2 
2.7 
4.1 
6.5 
4.7 
3.3 
2.2 
1.7 
1.9 
2.4 
2.4 
2.2 
2.5 
Exchange 
rate 
(S$/US$) 
3.1 
3.1 
3.1 
3.1 
3.1 
3.1 
3.1 
3.1 
3.1 
3.1 
3.1 
3.1 
2.8 
2.5 
2.4 
2.4 
2.5 
2.4 
2.3 
2.2 
2.1 
2.1 
2.1 
2.1 
2.1 
2.2 
2.2 
2.1 
2 
2 
1.8 
1.7 
1.6 
1.6 
1.5 
1.4 
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1996 
1997 
1998 
1999 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
19900 
20887 
20027 
21157 
22767 
21769 
22153 
22238 
23636 
73 
79.2 
78.6 
83.6 
91.5 
89.6 
92.2 
94.5 
102.5 
8.1 
8.5 
-0.9 
6.4 
9.4 
-2.1 
3 
2.5 
8.4 
1.4 
2 
-0.3 
0 
1.4 
1 
-0.4 
0.5 
1.7 
50.3 
51.4 
53.3 
50.3 
48.5 
44.6 
43.9 
46.7 
48 
35.9 
39.2 
32.3 
32.4 
32.8 
26.3 
22.8 
14.8 
18.3 
7190 
6510 
13400 
12400 
12700 
15700 
19900 
29300 
31210 
137495 
138716 
117717 
124468 
149228 
133744 
137429 
157853 
197256 
9802 
11803 
12093 
13701 
15623 
18361 
20657 
22218 
23636 
1487 
1119 
4614 
8541 
11924 
-2134 
1941 
5894 
5392 
2.4 
1.9 
2.5 
3.6 
4.4 
2.7 
4.2 
4.5 
4.4 
1.4 
1.5 
1.7 
1.7 
1.7 
1.8 
1.8 
1.7 
1.7 
Note: GDP and GDP per capita are in 2000 constant prices. 
Source: World Development Indicators (2005); Key Indicators, Asian Development Bank (1999, 2005); EIU country 
data; Department of Statistics, Singapore; Economic & Social Statistics, Singapore 1960-1982, Department of 
Statistics, Singapore. 
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Table 2 Major Indicators of Korean Economic Growth 1960-2004 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
GDP 
per 
capita 
(US$) 
* 
156 
92 
104 
142 
121 
106 
130 
157 
195 
239 
279 
302 
323 
403 
556 
608 
824 
1042 
1383 
1747 
1674 
1846 
1938 
2118 
2307 
2368 
2703 
3368 
4466 
5438 
6153 
7123 
7555 
8221 
9522 
11468 
GDP 
per 
capita 
(US$) 
** 
1110 
1133 
1129 
1205 
1263 
1297 
1427 
1480 
1616 
1804 
1913 
2028 
2076 
2280 
2397 
2491 
2710 
2935 
3160 
3323 
3223 
3369 
3560 
3886 
4149 
4388 
4810 
5293 
5801 
6133 
6618 
7173 
7526 
7916 
8515 
9164 
GDP 
(US$b) 
* 
3.9 
2.4 
2.7 
3.9 
3.4 
3 
3.8 
4.7 
6 
7.5 
8.9 
9.9 
10.7 
13.7 
19.2 
21.5 
29.6 
37.9 
51.1 
65.6 
63.8 
71.5 
76.2 
84.5 
93.2 
96.6 
111.3 
140 
187.4 
230.5 
263.8 
308.2 
329.9 
362.2 
423.3 
517.1 
GDP 
(US$b) 
** 
27.8 
29.1 
29.9 
32.7 
35.2 
37 
41.7 
44.2 
49.4 
56.4 
61.1 
66.1 
69.1 
77.4 
82.9 
87.9 
97.2 
106.9 
116.8 
124.7 
122.9 
130.5 
140 
155.1 
167.7 
179.1 
198.1 
220.1 
243.5 
259.9 
283.7 
310.4 
328.6 
348.8 
378.5 
413.2 
GDP 
growth 
(%) 
-
4.9 
2.5 
9.5 
7.6 
5.2 
12.7 
6.1 
11.7 
14.1 
8.3 
8.2 
4.5 
12 
7.2 
5.9 
10.6 
10 
9.3 
6.8 
-1.5 
6.2 
7.3 
10.8 
8.1 
6.8 
10.6 
11.1 
10.6 
6.7 
9.2 
9.4 
5.9 
6.1 
8.5 
9.2 
CPI 
(%) 
-
10 
4.5 
21.7 
28.6 
13.9 
12.2 
10.9 
11.8 
12.3 
15.6 
13.5 
10.7 
3.2 
25 
25 
15.3 
9.8 
14.7 
18.3 
28.7 
21.4 
7.2 
3.5 
2.2 
2.4 
2.8 
3.1 
7.1 
5.6 
8.6 
9.4 
6.3 
4.8 
6.2 
4.4 
Gross 
domestic 
savings 
(%) 
1.9 
3.6 
1.7 
7.4 
6.5 
7.8 
12.1 
11.8 
13.6 
17.3 
14.8 
14.4 
16.2 
21.8 
20.3 
19.6 
24.2 
27.1 
28.5 
28.3 
23.3 
23.5 
25.3 
27.1 
29.2 
29.7 
33.3 
36.4 
37.6 
34.9 
35.3 
35.6 
34.7 
34.4 
34.2 
36.6 
Gross 
capital 
formation 
(%) 
11.4 
13.4 
13.4 
18.7 
14.4 
15.6 
22.5 
22.9 
27 
30 
25.4 
25.5 
21.6 
25.6 
32 
28.7 
26.7 
28.7 
33.1 
36.1 
31.8 
29.6 
28.7 
29 
30.3 
30 
29.1 
30.3 
31.4 
33.9 
37.5 
39.7 
37.3 
35.7 
37 
37.7 
Trade 
balance 
(US$m) 
-273 
-242 
-335 
-410 
-245 
-241 
-430 
-574 
-836 
-992 
-992 
-1044 
-574 
-566 
-1938 
-1671 
-590 
-477 
-1780 
-4395 
-4613 
-3849 
-2827 
-1849 
-1089 
-20 
4299 
7529 
11283 
4345 
-2461 
-6904 
-1907 
2150 
-3017 
-4365 
Exports 
(US$m) 
33 
41 
55 
87 
120 
175 
250 
335 
486 
658 
882 
1133 
1676 
3284 
4516 
5003 
7814 
10046 
12711 
14705 
17245 
20747 
20934 
23272 
26486 
26633 
34128 
46560 
59973 
61832 
63660 
70546 
76210 
82098 
94983 
124934 
Foreign 
debt 
(US$m) 
-
-
-
157 
177 
206 
392 
645 
1199 
1800 
2245 
2922 
3589 
4260 
5937 
8456 
10533 
12648 
14871 
20287 
27170 
32433 
37083 
40378 
43053 
46729 
44500 
39808 
35715 
32798 
34968 
39733 
44156 
47202 
72414 
85810 
FDI 
(US$m) 
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
75 
73 
61 
16 
-20 
55 
-82 
-61 
58 
-358 
-767 
101 
371 
520 
-263 
-309 
-433 
-752 
-1652 
-1776 
Unempl- Exchange 
oyment rate 
(%) (S$/US$) 
11.7 
12.7 
9.8 
8.2 
7.7 
7.4 
7.1 
6.2 
5.1 
4.8 
4.5 
4.5 
4.5 
4 
4.1 
4.1 
3.9 
3.8 
3.2 
3.8 
5.2 
4.5 
4.4 
4.1 
3.8 
4 
3.8 
3.1 
2.5 
2.6 
2.5 
2.4 
2.5 
2.9 
2.5 
2.1 
63.1 
124.8 
130 
130 
213.8 
266.4 
271.3 
270.5 
276.6 
288.2 
310.6 
347.1 
392.9 
398.3 
404.5 
484 
484 
484 
484 
484 
607.4 
681 
731.1 
775.7 
806 
870 
881.5 
822.6 
731.5 
671.5 
707.8 
733.4 
780.7 
802.7 
803.4 
771.3 
64 
1996 
1997 
1998 
1999 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
12249 
11251 
7454 
9549 
10890 
10178 
11482 
12709 
14136 
9712 
10069 
9311 
10123 
10890 
11228 
11936 
12236 
12743 
557.6 
517 
345 
445.2 
511.9 
482 
546.7 
608.1 
679.7 
442.2 
462.7 
431 
471.9 
511.9 
531.6 
568.6 
586.2 
613.5 
7 
4.7 
-6.9 
9.5 
8.5 
3.8 
7 
3.1 
4.6 
5 
4.4 
7.5 
.8 
2.2 
4.1 
2.7 
3.6 
3.6 
35.4 
35.4 
37.9 
35.8 
34.2 
31.6 
30.5 
31.9 
-
38.9 
36 
25 
29.1 
31 
29.3 
29.1 
29.3 
-
-15077 
-3256 
41665 
28463 
16954 
13488 
14777 
22161 
38161 
130038 
138731 
132251 
145735 
176221 
151478 
163414 
197637 
257745 
115803 
137138 
139270 
130508 
128396 
110109 
143013 
161581 
177643 
-2260 
-1560 
673 
5136 
4285 
1108 
-224 
-207 
3397 
2 
2.6 
7 
6.6 
4.4 
4 
3.3 
3.6 
3.7 
804.5 
951.3 
1401.4 
1188.8 
1131 
1291 
1251.1 
1191.6 
1145.3 
Note: *: data in current price; **: data in 2000 constant price. 
Source: World Development Indicators (2005); Key Indicators, Asian Development Bank (1999, 2005); EIU country 
data; Korean National Statistical Office; Harvie and Lee (2003). 
Table 3. 10 Major Agenda Items in Tripartite Agreement 
1) Management Transparency, Corporate Financial Structure and Business Re-
structuring (corporate accounting, credit management systems, banking reform, re-
structuring of chaebol) 
2) Stabilization of Prices (price controls of all kinds) 
3) Employment Stabilization (employment insurance expansion, benefits, support for 
unemployed workers, job placement services, expansion of vocational training, job 
creation, redundancy) 
4) Extension & Consolidation of Social Security 
5) Wage Stabilization and Enhancement of Labor-Management Collaboration 
6) Protection of Basic Labor Rights (works councils, teachers unions, political activities 
of trade unions, union structure, etc.) 
7. Enhancement of Labor Market Flexibility (employment adjustment, layoffs, 
retrenchments, contract workers, advance notification) 
8. Exports and International Balance of Payments Improvement 
9. Other Issues 
10. Agenda for Social Cohesion (corruption, money laundering, pardon for arrested labor 
leaders) 
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Table 4: Macro Economic Conditions before and after the Oil Crisis 
Year 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
Real GDP 
Growth 
Rate (%) 
13.3 
11.3 
6.8 
4.0 
7.2 
Unemployment 
Rate (%) 
4.7 
4.4 
3.9 
4.5 
4.4 
Inflation 
rate (%) 
1.9 
19.9 
22.2 
2.6 
-1.8 
Oil Prices 
(US$ per 
barrel) 
1.9 
2.8 
10.4 
10.7 
11.6 
Source: Lim Chong Yah (1998)4. 
Table 5: Wages during the Oil Crisis 
Year 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
Gross 
wage 
$ 
368 
412 
488 
555 
581 
Gross 
wage 
growth 
(%) 
-
12.1 
18.2 
13.8 
4.7 
Net 
wage 
$ 
328 
360 
424 
483 
505 
Net 
wage 
growth 
(%) 
-
9.7 
17.7 
13.8 
4.7 
Real 
gross 
wage 
$ 
828 
775 
749 
832 
887 
Real 
gross 
wage 
growth 
(%) 
-
-6.5 
-3.3 
11 
6.6 
Real 
net 
wage 
$ 
694 
635 
612 
679 
724 
Real 
net 
wage 
growth 
(%) 
-
-8.5 
-3.7 
11 
6.6 
Source: Yah (1998). 
4
 Here again, there are slight differences between Yah’s figures and those in Table 1, especially for GDP 
and inflation rates. Given the lack of information on Yah’s method of calculation nor the source of his data, 
we are unable to reconcile these figures. 
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Table 6. CPF Contributions in Singapore, (as percent of income) Selected years. 
Year 
1968 
1970 
1972 
1974 
1980 
1982 
1983 
1986 
1991 
1994 
1997 
Employee 
Contribution 
% 
6.5 
10 
11 
15 
18 
23 
23 
25 
23 
21.5 
20 
Employer 
Contribution 
% 
6.5 
10 
15 
15.5 
20.5 
23 
25 
12 
17.5 
18.5 
20 
Total Contribution 
% 
13 
20 
26 
31 
38.5 
46 
48 
37 
40.5 
40 
40 
Source: Nga (1998), p175. 
Table 7: Per Capita Comparative GDP growth Rates, Before and After Crisis 
Country 
Thailand 
Korea 
Indonesia 
Malaysia 
1996 
5.5 
7.1 
8.2 
8.6 
1997 
-0.5 
5.0 
1.9 
7.8 
1998 
-9.9 
-5.8 
-13.6 
-6.1 
1999 
1.0 
10.7 
-4.0 
0.9 
2000 
5 
8 
3.5 
-
Source: Horton and Mazumdar (2001) 
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Figure 1 : Percent Change in Unit Labor Costs. 
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